Due Process and Counterterrorism by Guiora, Amos N.
Emory International Law Review 
Volume 26 Issue 1 
2012 
Due Process and Counterterrorism 
Amos N. Guiora 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr 
Recommended Citation 
Amos N. Guiora, Due Process and Counterterrorism, 26 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 163 (2012). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol26/iss1/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu. 
GUIORA GALLEYSPROOFS.2 6/28/2012 10:28 AM 
 
DUE PROCESS AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
Amos N. Guiora∗ 
Counterterrorism—like terrorism—is a reality. Nations have the absolute 
obligation and right to protect innocent civilians against those seeking to harm 
them. However, implementation of counterterrorism obligations must be 
tempered by due process. The essence of democracy is granting—and 
protecting—the civil and political rights of attacker and attacked alike. Failure 
to provide due process to individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism 
leads a society down a slippery slope from which there is no return. While 
controversial and perhaps unappetizing, the true test of democracy is protection 
of those seeking to attack it. 
This Article examines counterterrorism from the perspective of detention, 
interrogation, and trial, and in particular how these three processes are 
articulated and implemented. The broader question is whether the 
contemporary counterterrorism paradigm is based in due process or in a legal, 
not necessarily lawful, regime that minimizes individual rights. That is, does 
civil, democratic society discard core principles in the face of an ongoing, 
viable threat; or are political rights and national security rights effectively 
balanced in order to protect both? Answering this question requires analyzing 
the interface between threats and rights, and in particular the extent to which 
society responds to the former while protecting the latter. 
The challenges facing national decision-makers are extraordinary, as the 
public demands concrete measures in response to attacks. Decision-makers are 
charged with simultaneously protecting both the law and the public in 
accordance with core values of rights and morality. Balancing these competing 
responsibilities manifests in what I refer to as the “dilemma of the decision-
maker.”1 The terrorism/counterterrorism paradigm manifests these tensions 
and uncertainties in a more powerful manner than perhaps any other issue 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah; author of Freedom from Religion: 
Rights and National Security (2009). Many thanks to Katharine Tyler (J.D., S.J. Quinney College of Law, 
University of Utah (2011)) for her insightful editorial comments and suggestions. 
 1 See Counter-terrorism Simulation: The 2010 Sim, S.J. QUINNEY COLL. L., http://simulation.law.utah. 
edu/past-sims/sim-2010 (last visited Apr. 1, 2012) (showing snippets of a scenario-based counterterrorism 
simulation exercise, in which students role-play decision-makers addressing complex, operational 
counterterrorism dilemmas). 
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confronting contemporary decision-makers and the public. The public’s 
visceral reaction to feeling threatened is reflected in a 2009 survey, finding that 
“[f]ifty-eight percent (58%) of U.S. voters say waterboarding and other 
aggressive interrogation techniques should be used to gain information from 
the terrorist who attempted to bomb an airliner on Christmas Day.”2 
Terrorism, in its broadest articulation, is the constant threat faced by 
decision-makers mandated with ensuring that national institutions are 
sufficiently prepared to act both proactively and reactively; preferably the 
former, but if need be, the latter. The public demands solutions and minimal 
accommodation of terrorists.3 However—public demands notwithstanding—
operational counterterrorism cannot justify discarding civil and political rights. 
Benjamin Franklin’s much-cited words of wisdom—“They who can give up 
essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty or 
safety”4—capture the essence of this constant and unremitting tension. 
Franklin’s words concisely and accurately reflect the overwhelming danger 
posed by overreaction to a clear and present danger, whether perceived or real. 
With respect to the paradigm before us—due process and counterterrorism—
Franklin’s words spoken more than 200 years ago capture the essence of the 
existential, philosophical, legal, and practical dilemmas of counterterrorism 
conducted in societies subject to the rule of law. 
Addressing this powerful tension, fraught with danger, is a fundamental 
challenge confronting decision-makers on a daily basis. Resolving it 
effectively defines the essence of a democratic regime. In exploring these 
competing tensions, this Article is divided into the following six Parts: 
Part 1: Terrorism defined; 
Part 2: Due process defined in the context of counterterrorism; 
Part 3: Detention criteria and standards; 
Part 4: Interrogation regimes and rights; 
Part 5: Judicial forums; and 
 
 2 58% Favor Waterboarding of Plane Terrorist To Get Information, RASMUSSEN REP. (Dec. 31, 2009), 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/december_2009/58_favor_waterbo
arding_of_plane_terrorist_to_get_information. 
 3 J. Daniel Moore, Intelligence in Recent Public Literature, 46 STUD. INTELLIGENCE, no. 1, 2002 
(reviewing PAUL R. PILLAR, TERRORISM AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (2001)), available at https://www. 
cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no1/article07. 
html. 
 4 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN & WILLIAM TEMPLE FRANKLIN, MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, LL.D. 270 (1818). 
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Part 6: Moving forward. 
I. TERRORISM DEFINED 
Applying due process to counterterrorism initially requires defining 
terrorism; otherwise, the discussion is vague and amorphous. While the 
requirement to define terrorism is largely—but not unanimously—agreed upon 
as essential, much disagreement surrounds the actual definition.5 To that end, I 
propose the following definition, which addresses the core essence of 
terrorism: 
Terrorism is an act by an individual or individuals intended to 
advance one of four causes: religious, social, economic, or political; 
for the purposes of advancing the identified cause, the actor kills or 
harms innocent civilians or causes property damage to innocent 
civilians or intimidates the civilian population from conducting its 
daily life. 
This definition incorporates the critical aspects of attacking civilian targets 
randomly for the purpose of advancing a specific cause, devoid of pecuniary or 
personal gain for the actor. 
Counterterrorism should be simultaneously viewed from two distinct 
perspectives. One branch of counterterrorism consists of operational measures, 
ranging from detention to imposition of administrative sanctions to killing 
suspected terrorists. The other branch is comprised of “soft” measures, ranging 
from building schools and hospitals to economic investment and infrastructure 
development. The latter branch’s target audience is those who can be 
dissuaded. These are individuals who understand that terrorism does not 
benefit their families or communities, but are dependent on concrete measures 
demonstrating that the benefits of progress and modernity outweigh the harm 
terrorism inflicts. 
The burden is—fairly or unfairly—imposed on the nation-state to 
demonstrate the positives inherent to progress and development. Failure to 
fully embrace this burden reinforces the negativity that is an inevitable by-
product of operational counterterrorism, which inherently conjures negative 
images for those living amongst the terrorists. While those who live amongst 
terrorists may oppose terrorism principally for the damage caused to the 
 
 5 Terrorism: The Problems of Definition, CENTER FOR DEF. INFO. (Aug. 1, 2003), http://www.cdi.org/ 
program/document.cfm?documentid=1564&programID=39&from_page. 
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community and therefore—tacitly—understand the legitimacy of operational 
counterterrorism, speaking out in opposition exposes them and their families to 
extraordinary harm and risk. Therefore, soft counterterrorism is a critical 
weapon the nation-state can use that is no less potent than more conventional 
counterterrorism weapons. 
To determine the efficacy of particular counterterrorism measures—
whether operational or soft—terms must be defined. Framing the discussion 
with adequate parameters allows for rigorous analysis.6 One of the realities of 
homeland security is that threats, risks, and dangers are largely murky and, 
consequently, unarticulated to the public. However, in order to maximize 
protection of due process rights, viable, direct, and concrete threats must be 
distinguished from indirect threats that do not pose imminent harm to the 
nation-state. The danger in decision-makers viewing all threats as viable and 
valid is to minimize cautious discernment, thereby significantly enhancing the 
danger of overreaction and, therefore, violations of individual rights.7 
One of the key challenges of counterterrorism is that it is difficult to 
identify targets; this suggests a fundamental lack of clarity and conciseness. 
Therefore, decision-makers must specifically determine and narrowly define 
both what is a legitimate target and when the target poses a threat justifying 
operational engagement.8 The failure to engage in a robust debate regarding 
both definition and application directly contributes to operational overreaction, 
which has tactical and strategic ramifications that, in the main, prevent 
effective counterterrorism, whether “operational” or “soft.” 
Definitions minimize amorphousness, thereby reducing wiggle room 
otherwise available to the executive branch. This is particularly important with 
respect to the due process discussion; by failing to clearly define what rights 
are to be protected, the ability to minimize rights is greatly enhanced. In the 
tension and fear that pervade the terrorism/counterterrorism discussion, 
 
 6 See The Resilient Homeland: How DHS Intelligence Should Empower America To Prepare for, 
Prevent, and Withstand Terror Attacks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence, Info. Sharing, and 
Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. 9–17 (2008) (statement of Amos 
N. Guiora, Professor, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah) [hereinafter The Resilient Homeland]. 
 7 See Right to Fair Trial, COUNTER-TERRORISM IMPLEMENTATION TASK FORCE, http://www.un.org/en/ 
terrorism/ctitf/proj_righttotrial.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2012) (“In their fight against terrorism, some States 
have conducted activities which infringe basic standards of fair trial, while in others the implementation of 
counter-terrorism measures limits access to the judicial process.”). 
 8 The term “engagement” describes operational engagement (in accordance with “rules of 
engagement”), arrest/detention, and other actions that impose limits on personal freedom, thereby raising 
questions directly related to due process. 
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minimizing individual rights in response to either a threat or an attack is, 
lamentably, a recurring theme. American history is replete with examples of 
panic responses that directly—and unjustifiably—influenced the due process 
rights of innocent individuals deprived of civil and political rights.9 While 
lawful counterterrorism involves imposing the full weight of government 
power on individuals, its legality hinges on determining whether the relevant 
state action is predicated on person-specific due process principles.10 
Otherwise, both the rule of law and morality take a dangerous and unwarranted 
back seat to collective punishment based on an approach most accurately 
described as “round up the usual suspects.” 
II. DUE PROCESS DEFINED IN THE CONTEXT OF COUNTERTERRORISM 
To determine the range and application of due process11 in the 
counterterrorism paradigm, we next turn our attention to the first document 
believed to directly address the question of due process, the Magna Carta.12 
Chapters 39 and 40 of the Magna Carta state: “No freemen shall be taken or 
imprisoned . . . or in any way destroyed . . . except by the lawful judgment of 
his peers or by the law of the land. To no one will we sell, to no one will we 
refuse or delay, right or justice.”13 According to the 1354 statutory rendition of 
this text: “[N]o Man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put out of 
his Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to 
Death, without being brought in Answer by due Process of the Law.”14 
Clearly drawing on those words, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution guarantees similar rights: 
 
 9 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 
U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863); Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798); Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 
(1798); Alien Friends Act ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798); Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798); Attorney 
General A. Mitchell Palmer on Charges Made Against Department of Justice by Louis F. Post and Others: 
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 66th Cong. 27 (1920). 
 10 See Right to Fair Trial, supra note 7 (“States are under the obligation to ensure that all guarantees of 
due process are respected when persons who are alleged to have committed terrorism-related offences are 
arrested, charged, detained and prosecuted.”). 
 11 For a thoughtful discussion regarding due process, see Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975). 
 12 For insightful articles addressing the historical roots of due process, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, An 
Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth 
Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585 (2009) and Andrew T. Hyman, The Little Word “Due,” 38 AKRON L. REV. 1 
(2005). 
 13 MAGNA CARTA chs. 39–40. 
 14 Liberty of Subject, 1354, 28 Edw. 3, c. 3, § 3 (Eng.), modern English translation available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Edw3/28/3. 
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No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.15 
Justice Harlan, in his much-cited dissent in Poe v. Ullman, wrote that due 
process: 
[I]n the consistent view of this Court has ever been a broader 
concept. . . . Were due process merely a procedural safeguard it 
would fail to reach those situations where the deprivation of life, 
liberty or property was accomplished by legislation which by 
operating in the future could, given even the fairest possible 
procedure in application to individuals, nevertheless destroy the 
enjoyment of all three. Thus the guaranties of due process, though 
having their roots in Magna Carta’s “per legem terrae” and 
considered as procedural safeguards “against executive usurpation 
and tyranny,” have in this country “become bulwarks also against 
arbitrary legislation.”16 
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the U.S. Congress passed the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, collectively known as the 
Reconstruction Amendments. The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to 
guarantee the rights and civil liberties of recently freed slaves, by denying 
states the right to abridge privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens without 
due process: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.17 
 
 15 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 16 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Hurtado 
v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884)). 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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In a similar vein, the Treaty of Lisbon18 does not contain a specific 
provision regarding due process, but as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
Treaty on European Union gives binding force to the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which was originally proclaimed in 2000 and revised in 
2007.19 The European Charter of Fundamental Rights has specific provisions 
addressing both judicial protection and the right to a fair trial. According to 
Article 47: 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of 
the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a 
tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously 
established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being 
advised, defended and represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient 
resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access 
to justice.20 
Similarly, according to Article 48: “1. Everyone who has been charged shall be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 2. Respect for the 
rights of the defence of anyone who has been charged shall be guaranteed.”21 
In spite of the above, a decade after 9/11, civil democratic society seeking 
to establish counterterrorism policy predicated on the rule of law has largely 
failed to satisfactorily address two core questions: how to apply due process 
and to whom in the context of counterterrorism.22 The failure to do so results 
directly from an unwillingness—or inability—among these decision-makers to 
articulate with consistency and certainty the limits of operational 
counterterrorism.23 Rather than developing a coherent policy reflecting a 
 
 18 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. 
 19 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2007 O.J. (C 303) 1. 
 20 Id. art. 47. 
 21 Id. art. 48. 
 22 See David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventative Detention, Suspected Terrorists and War, 97 CALIF. 
L. REV. 693, 695 (2009) (stating that questions relating to who may be put under preventative detention and 
what substantive and procedural safeguards should accompany such detention are among the most 
controversial of legal questions); Gary Thompson, Guantanamo and the Struggle for Due Process of Law, 63 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1195, 1199–1200, 1213 (2011) (stating that while the debate as to how much due process to 
give detainees at Guantanamo Bay continues without resolution, the detainees have in effect become convicted 
criminals serving ten-year sentences). 
 23 See Ersun N. Kurtulus, The New Counterterrorism: Contemporary Counterterrorism Trends in the 
United States and Israel, 35 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 37, 45 (2012) (arguing that a debate among 
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successful melding of legitimate operational requirements with self-imposed 
restraints, the Bush and Obama Administrations have either implemented 
measures that violated international and domestic law24 or seemed incapable of 
developing a consistent, articulated coherent policy.25 
While President Obama signed an Executive Order ordering the closure of 
the Guantanamo Bay detention center26 for the purpose of discontinuing trials 
before Military Commissions, in April 2010 the Obama Administration 
reinstituted the Military Commissions.27 It is unclear whether this represents 
reversal of a policy previously articulated but not implemented, or a stopgap 
measure. Whatever the explanation, the Obama Administration has largely 
failed to satisfactorily address the rule-of-law questions essential to creating 
and implementing counterterrorism policy that ensures implementation of due 
process guarantees and obligations. For example, the Administration has failed 
to resolve whether Article III courts are the proper judicial forums for 
suspected terrorists.28 Perhaps this continuing failure is reflective of political 
infighting, as demonstrated in the backtracking with respect to Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed’s trial.29 The result is a disturbing failure to ensure due process for 
individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism. 
 
academics about the use of torture for counterterrorism provides legitimacy for the normalization of torture 
because it indicates that torture is an option that can be considered). 
 24 See BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. (Dec. 29, 2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/ 
investigating_violations_of_the_rule_of_law_in_counter_terrorism_policy; Editorial, Lawless and Soon Long 
Gone, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2008, at A16 (“This editorial page has been uncompromising in its criticism of the 
Bush administration’s flouting of international and domestic law. The administration was wrong to evade 
courts in seeking warrantless surveillance of Americans, wrong to establish the Guantanamo Bay detention 
center, heinous in its acceptance of torture.”); Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Says 
DOJ Investigation into CIA Interrogation Program Too Narrow (June 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-says-doj-investigation-cia-interrogation-program-too-narrow (“For 
a period of several years, and with the approval of the Bush administration’s most senior officials, the CIA 
operated an interrogation program that subjected prisoners to unimaginable cruelty and violated both 
international and domestic law.”). 
 25 Anne E. Kornblut & Peter Finn, Obama Aides Near Reversal on 9/11 Trial, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 
2010, at A1; Charlie Savage, In Reversal, Military Trials for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, at A1. 
 26 Background: President Obama Signs Executive Orders of Detention and Interrogation Policy, WHITE 
HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/BACKGROUNDPresidentObamasignsExecutiveOrders 
onDetentionandInterrogationPolicy (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). 
 27 Peter Finn, Military Tribunal Opens Hearings on Youngest Guantanamo Detainee, WASH. POST, Apr. 
29, 2010, at A4; Morris Davis, Obama and Change at Guantanamo: Believe It When You See It, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Apr. 27, 2010, 7:36 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/morris-davis/obama-and-change-at-
guant_b_553113.html. 
 28 Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, Obama Allows Indefinite Detention, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2011, at 
A1. 
 29 Savage, supra note 25. 
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More fundamentally, the status of individuals detained post-9/11 has not 
been uniformly or consistently articulated or applied. That is, varying 
definitions have been articulated at different times, reflecting legal and policy 
uncertainty directly affecting the ability to establish and consistently apply a 
legal regime based on due process.30 For thousands of individuals whose initial 
detention was based on questionable intelligence and subsequent, inadequate 
habeas protections, the current regime is inherently devoid of due process.31 
I propose that detainees are neither prisoners of war nor criminals in the 
traditional sense; rather, they are a hybrid of both. To that end, I propose that 
the appropriate term for post-9/11 detainees is a combination—a convergence 
of the criminal law and law of war paradigms—best described as a hybrid 
paradigm. 
Over the years, terms such as enemy combatant, illegal combatant, 
unlawful combatant, and illegal belligerent have been used to describe an 
individual engaged in combat who either has lost his status as a soldier, or 
never acquired it in the first place.32 Articulating this definition and 
determining the status of the enemy are of the utmost importance, particularly 
in the context of due process considerations. 
The hybrid paradigm is philosophically and jurisprudentially founded on 
the principle that the accused must have judicial resolution of his status before 
a court of law.33 However, as touched on in subsequent sections, the American 
criminal law process is largely inapplicable to the current conflict.34 Hence, to 
guarantee the suspect certain rights and privileges in accordance with due 
 
 30 MICHAEL GARCIA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40139, CLOSING THE GUANTANAMO DETENTION 
CENTER: LEGAL ISSUES 55–56 (2011). 
 31 Cole, supra note 22, at 725–26, 744–745; Thompson, supra note 22, at 1198, 1213. 
 32 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (stating that “[t]he spy who secretly and without uniform 
passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war . . . or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes 
secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property” are examples of 
belligerents not entitled to prisoner-of-war status, and as offenders of the law of war, subject to trial and 
punishment by military tribunals); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507 (2004) (showing the evolving definitions of key terms in recent years).  
 33 Amos N. Guiora, The Quest for Individual Adjudication and Accountability: Are International 
Tribunals the Right Response to Terrorism?, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 497, 506 (2010). 
 34 Id. at 508; The Resilient Homeland, supra note 6, at 9–17; Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, 
Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1081 
(2008); Glenn M. Sulmasy, The Legal Landscape After Hamdan: The Creation of Homeland Security Courts, 
13 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 10 (2006); Andrew C. McCarthy & Alykhan Velshi, Outsourcing 
American Law: We Need a National Security Court 3–10 (Am. Enterprise Inst., Working Paper No. 156, 
2009), http://www.aei.org/files/2009/08/20/20090820-Chapter6.pdf. 
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process principles, the hybrid paradigm is predicated on criteria-based initial 
detention and subsequent remand decisions, interrogation methods that do not 
include torture, the right to appeal conviction (regardless of before what court 
convicted) to an independent judiciary, the right to counsel of the suspect’s 
own choosing, known terms of imprisonment, and procedures to prevent 
indefinite detention. 
Justice O’Connor’s unfortunate words in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld—“the 
Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the 
Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one 
and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided”—are extraordinarily 
problematic and troubling.35 Simply stated, the Constitution does not contain a 
rebuttable presumption that favors the state at the expense of a defendant’s 
rights. O’Connor’s unfortunate phrasing is, largely, in accordance with the late 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s judicial philosophy with respect to the role of the 
Supreme Court during armed conflict: “The laws will thus not be silent in time 
of war, but they will speak with a somewhat different voice.”36 
In analyzing the application of due process to counterterrorism, Justice 
O’Connor’s words highlight the essence of the philosophical, existential, and 
legal tension between powerful competing standards and tests. The essence of 
Justice O’Connor’s unfortunate phrasing is to suggest that at the critical 
confluence—the actual meeting place—between legitimate individual rights 
and equally legitimate national security rights, the Constitution’s protections 
are not to be fully extended to the defendant. 
In the coming Parts, I examine how—if at all—due process has been 
applied with respect to detention, interrogation, and trial paradigms; the 
“guide” will be the principle that due process is essential for counterterrorism 
to be lawful and moral. To what extent it should be applied is an 
implementation question; the principled decision that has been largely avoided 
by successive American administrations is whether it should be applied at all. 
While the Supreme Court has addressed the habeas corpus issue in 
Boumediene v. Bush37 and Judge Bates did the same in Al Maqaleh v. Gates,38 
my focus will be on the executive branch and how it has applied—or not 
 
 35 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
 36 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WAR TIME 225 (1998). 
 37 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723. 
 38 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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applied—due process to counterterrorism. That is the essential question to be 
examined; it is to that I turn my attention. 
III.  DETENTION CRITERIA AND STANDARDS 
Detention—depriving an individual of his freedom—is lawful in the 
American criminal law paradigm, requiring probable cause pertaining to past 
acts.39 The initial arrest, provided exigent circumstances do not exist,40 requires 
an arrest warrant issued by a “neutral and detached magistrate” in response to a 
request submitted by law enforcement based on evidence or sourced 
information.41 In addition to the initial detention, the court may conclude that 
continued detention is warranted, predicated on a variety of factors including 
severity of the crime, danger posed by the suspect, and whether the individual 
is a possible flight risk.42 The presence of these additional factors allows the 
court to require additional detention. This detention model, with varying 
degrees of interpretation subject to country-specific criminal procedure codes, 
is largely representative in countries adhering to the rule of law and separation 
of powers between the executive and judiciary.43 Judicial review of the 
executive is essential to preserving liberty and due process.44 
However, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Bush Administration 
established an alternative paradigm for those detained in the so-called “Global 
War on Terrorism.” Rather than relying on the traditional model, the 
Administration created an alternative model that is fundamentally deficient 
with respect to due process. Devoid of probable cause standards, much less 
review by an independent judiciary, the Bush Administration implemented the 
 
 39 Probable cause is defined as “[a] reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is 
committing a crime.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1321 (9th ed. 2009). 
 40 See Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 636 (2002) (per curiam) (“‘[A]bsent exigent circumstances,’ the 
‘firm line at the entrance to the house . . . may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.’” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980))). 
 41 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905–25 
(1984). 
 42 18 U.S.C. § 1342(g) (2006); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533–34 (1979); United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 43 Australia and Great Britain, two democratic nations that follow the doctrine of separation of powers, 
utilize detention models similar to the one put in place in the United States. See Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004], 
HCA 37 (Austl.); Clare Feikert, Pre-charge Detention for Terrorist Suspects: United Kingdom, LIBR. 
CONGRESS (2008), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-pre-charge-detention.php. 
 44 For an article comparing Israeli and American judicial review, see Amos N. Guiora & Erin Page, 
Going Toe to Toe: President Barak’s and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Theories of Judicial Activism, 29 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 51 (2006). 
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unitary executive theory45 paradigm, a system devoid of probable cause 
standards that has been actively advocated by Professor John Yoo46 and David 
Addington47 amongst others. 
The significance of the unitary executive theory in the due process 
discussion is profound: in essence, it significantly minimizes the role and 
power of the legislature and judiciary with respect to counterterrorism. The 
unitary executive theory raises profound questions regarding the application of 
established constitutional principles of separation of powers48 and checks and 
balances49 to counterterrorism. According to its proponents, the theory 
establishes a constitutional model whereby the executive assumes 
extraordinary powers at the absolute “expense” of the judiciary and legislative 
branches.50 
With respect to due process—the rights so carefully protected by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments—the Bush Administration’s approach was to 
create a paradigm that largely denied detainees their fundamental rights.51 
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Rumsfeld v. Padilla addressed this directly: 
Whether respondent is entitled to immediate release is a question that 
reasonable jurists may answer in different ways. There is, however, 
only one possible answer to the question whether he is entitled to a 
hearing on the justification for his detention. At stake in this case is 
nothing less than the essence of a free society. Even more important 
than the method of selecting the people’s rulers and their successors 
 
 45 See Christopher S. Kelley, Rethinking Presidential Power—The Unitary Executive and the George W. 
Bush Presidency (2005) (paper prepared for the 63d Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, Illinois, Apr. 7–10, 2005), available at http://www.pegc.us/archive/Unitary% 
20Executive/annotated_kelly_unit_exec.pdf. 
 46 Yoo was the Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department 
of Justice. Yoo’s memo, The President’s Constitutional Authority To Conduct Military Operations Against 
Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, was critical in establishing the Bush Administration’s 
counterterrorism policy. Memorandum from John C. Yoo on The President’s Constitutional Authority To 
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them to the Deputy Counsel to the 
President (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm [hereinafter 
Memorandum from John C. Yoo]. 
 47 Addington was Vice President Cheney’s counsel and played a decisive role in creating and 
implementing the Bush Administration’s counterterrorism policies. 
 48 U.S. CONST. arts. I, § 1, III; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 49 U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III. The U.S. Constitution established a balance of power amongst the three 
branches of government with no one branch granted power to overcome another. 
 50 Undermining the Bill of Rights: The Bush Administration Detention Policy, PEOPLE FOR AM. WAY, 
http://www.pfaw.org/media-center/publications/undermining-the-bill-of-rights (last visited Apr. 1, 2012). 
 51 See generally id.; Memorandum from John C. Yoo, supra note 46; David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002). 
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is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the 
rule of law. Unconstrained Executive detention for the purpose of 
investigating and preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the 
Star Chamber. Access to counsel for the purpose of protecting the 
citizen from official mistakes and mistreatment is the hallmark of due 
process. Executive detention of subversive citizens, like detention of 
enemy soldiers to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes be 
justified to prevent persons from launching or becoming missiles of 
destruction. It may not, however, be justified by the naked interest in 
using unlawful procedures to extract information. Incommunicado 
detention for months on end is such a procedure. Whether the in-
formation so procured is more or less reliable than that acquired by 
more extreme forms of torture is of no consequence. For if this 
Nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must 
not wield the tools of tyrants even to resist an assault by the forces of 
tyranny.52 
The need to develop standards in determining when and why an individual may 
be detained is critical to establishing a due process predicated paradigm. As 
Justice Stevens’ dissent makes clear, the Bush Administration’s detention 
policy, with respect to post-9/11 detainees, was devoid of minimal due process 
standards. While this was in accordance with the worldview articulated by 
senior officials, it fell short of meeting constitutional standards according to 
Justice Stevens.53 However—and the caveat is essential—the appropriate query 
is whether 9/11 presented a threat that justified denying basic due process 
rights. 
In other words, is America’s national security sufficiently threatened to 
deny due process both with respect to initial and continued detention? While 
former U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld categorized the individuals 
detained in Guantanamo as the “worst of the worst,”54 facts indicate that his 
assessment was not accurate.55 The number of detainees released without any 
judicial process suggests that Rumsfeld’s statement was based neither on 
careful analysis nor articulated criteria.56 
 
 52 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 464 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Julian Borger, Guantanamo: Ten Years of Limbo, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2012, 12:50 PM), http://www. 
guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2012/jan/10/guantanamo-legacy-afghanistan. 
 55 KAREN J GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100 DAYS 160 (2009). 
 56 Id. 
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In the criminal law paradigm, a suspect’s remand requires independent 
judicial authorization;57 in the Military Commission’s model, a detainee’s 
remand would require neither judicial authorization nor review.58 Although the 
Court in Boumediene59 held that enemy combatants detained in Guantanamo 
have a constitutionally guaranteed right of habeas corpus review,60 and Judge 
Bates held in Al Maqaleh that some prisoners captured outside the zone of 
combat61 and detained at a U.S. military base in Afghanistan had a right to 
challenge their imprisonment,62 the reality is the following: hundreds of 
detainees are presently held—directly or indirectly—by the U.S. in a detention 
paradigm that can best be described as indefinite detention. While 
uncertainty—perhaps ambiguity63—was understandable in the immediate 
aftermath of 9/11, it is incomprehensible ten years later. 
According to the U.S. Constitution, “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion 
the public Safety may require it.”64 In the due process discussion, denying 
detainees the “Great Writ” is a fundamental violation of an otherwise 
guaranteed right for American citizens. While that right is guaranteed to 
American citizens, Professor David Cole has written: 
As politically tempting as the trade-off of immigrants’ liberties for 
our security may appear, we should not make it. As a matter of 
principle, the rights that we have selectively denied to immigrants are 
not reserved for citizens. The rights of political freedom, due process, 
and equal protection belong to every person subject to United States 
legal obligations, irrespective of citizenship.65 
 
 57 Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed 
Conflict–Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 369, 369 (2008). 
 58 Laura A. Dickenson, Using Legal Process To Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions, 
International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1415 (2002). 
 59 For an interesting analysis of Boumediene, see Jean-Marc Piret, Boumediene v. Bush and the 
Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. Constitution: A Step Towards Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 4 UTRECHT L. 
REV. 81 (2008). 
 60 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 61 Illegal Detentions in the “War on Terror,” AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/ 
indefinitedetention (last visited Apr. 24, 2012). 
 62 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 63 See generally Kenneth Anderson & Elisa Massimino, The Cost of Confusion: Resolving Ambiguities in 
Detainee Treatment (Am. Univ. Washington Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
2008-77, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=968177&rec=1&srcabs= 
938202. 
 64 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9. 
 65 Cole, supra note 51, at 1004. 
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At the confluence between due process, habeas corpus, and counterterrorism 
lies the question if, as Cole writes, rights and protections are to be extended to 
persons subject to U.S. legal obligations but not implicitly protected. Judge 
Bates’ decision affirms that principle by expanding the right to a category of 
individuals not previously granted the privilege.66 The dangers of not granting 
the right are extraordinary: the creation of a permanent class of individuals not 
entitled to independent judicial review whose status is best defined as 
“indefinite detention.” 
The question of whether to extend constitutional protections to non-citizens 
was originally addressed in the Dred Scott decision, which held that the Fifth 
Amendment was not limited to the geographic boundaries of the states, but 
rather, such protections were extended to all incorporated territories of the 
United States.67 In the 150 years since Dred Scott, the Court has discussed 
similar cases with two distinct “lines of demarcation” important for 
determining detainee rights: first, distinguishing between individuals within 
and outside of the United States; and second, distinguishing between citizens 
and non-citizens.68 
In discussing these two issues, case law slowly extended constitutional 
protections to include non-citizens, provided they could demonstrate 
cognizable ties to the United States.69 The clearest tie was physical location 
within the borders of the United States.70 In accordance with Johnson v. 
Eisentrager,71 this specific inquiry directly influences this Article’s question, 
as the decision of Guantanamo Bay’s status as a territory of the United States 
is of the utmost importance. If Guantanamo Bay is held as a territory of the 
United States, then the precedent dictates that fundamental rights, like the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, should apply. However, if it is not held to be a 
territory, then the constitutional protections would not necessarily be afforded. 
 
 66 Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 235. 
 67 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. 
 68 United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979). 
 69 See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 691 (2002) (citing Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. 
Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 310–11 (1970)). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). In Eisentrager, the petitioner sought habeas corpus 
review as a German national in the custody of the U.S. Army. The Supreme Court held that the German 
nationals who were being held based on a military commission conviction for having engaged in military 
activity against the United States possessed no right to a habeas corpus petition. Id. at 790–91. 
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Failing to institutionalize independent judicial review of detention 
decisions directly resulted in the significant number of detainees held 
indefinitely. If there are no criteria for determining what actions pose a threat 
to American national security, the detentions are reflective of an approach best 
described as “round up the usual suspects.” This is not a policy; it is a tragic 
reality of the past ten years. Indefinite detention perhaps sounds attractive, for 
it removes from the zone of combat—indefinitely—individuals suspected of 
involvement in terrorism. The qualifier “perhaps” is essential to the discussion, 
for the inherent unconstitutionality of indefinite detention has a pervasive 
effect on U.S. counterterrorism. Furthermore, the dearth of articulated criteria 
for initial detention and subsequent remand alike inevitably guarantees that 
individuals have been wrongly detained precisely because threat has not been 
defined. 
While Judge Bates’ decision was of the utmost importance—more than any 
Supreme Court holding addressing counterterrorism in the past eight years, 
save Boumediene—it has not resulted either in a significant re-articulation of 
U.S. policy nor in the granting of habeas corpus to thousands of detainees.72 
Aside from its decision in Boumediene, the Supreme Court has failed to 
articulate the rights granted to suspected terrorists. Similarly, Congress has 
failed to articulate these rights through its constitutionally granted oversight 
powers. It is essential to balance—or maximize—the legitimate rights of the 
individual with the equally legitimate national security rights of the state. 
Furthermore, Judge Bates’ decision seeks to move beyond the amorphousness 
that has defined much of the debate over the last ten years.73 
While it has been suggested that habeas hearings satisfactorily provide 
detainees “their day in court,” the measure does not establish a rights-based 
counterterrorism regime. Though habeas hearings enable the detainee to come 
before a judge, the process is fundamentally flawed both because the detention 
(original and remand) was not premised on carefully delineated criteria, and 
because adjudication of personal responsibility is not in the offing. The 
combination represents a significant failure with respect to establishing and 
maintaining a due process regime. That failure is compounded as we turn our 
attention to the interrogation of detainees. 
 
 72 See generally Andy Worthington, As Judges Kill Off Habeas Corpus for the Guantanamo Prisoners, 
Will the Supreme Court Act?, FUTURE FREEDOM FOUND. (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.fff.org/comment/ 
com1111v.asp. 
 73 See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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IV.  INTERROGATION REGIMES AND RIGHTS 
While the protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are 
inextricably tied to domestic criminal law interrogations, it is presently 
unresolved whether those rights will be extended to terrorism-related 
interrogations.74 Resolving this dilemma requires determining within which 
rubric terrorism falls: criminal law, law of war, or something else.75 Answering 
that question enables determination of the rights, privileges, and protections to 
be extended to individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism. In particular, 
with respect to the question this Article seeks to address, the fundamental issue 
is whether due process rights are to be extended regardless of the paradigm 
applied. 
To that end, from the due process perspective, the ultimate question 
regarding the Fifth Amendment is whether the right against self-incrimination 
should be extended to detainees.76 The question of whether an individual 
arrested in the “zone of combat”77 should be read his Miranda rights is likely 
 
 74 In the immediate aftermath of the so-called 2009 Christmas Day Detroit underwear bomber, Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab, several commentators addressed whether Miranda rights should have been extended in 
that case. See, e.g., Editorial, Christmas Day Negligence: The Unthinking Handling of a Would-Be Bomber, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2010, at A12; Benjy Radcliffe, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab: Enemy Combatant or 
Criminal, COURT (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.thecourt.ca/2010/02/04/umar-farouk-abdulmutallab-enemy-
combatant-or-criminal. 
 75 See Amos N. Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigm for Detaining Terrorists, 19 
FLA. J. INT’L L. 2 (2008); Robert M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the Preventive Detention 
Debate, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 669 (2009); Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 34; Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot 
Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on 
Terror, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 787 (2008). 
 76 Specifically, “nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. Scholars and Supreme Court cases alike have analyzed the significance of this right in 
various contexts. See generally Russell D. Covey, Interrogation Warrants, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1867 (2005); 
Paul G. Alvarez, Comment, Taking Back Miranda: How Seibert and Patane Can Keep “Question-First” and 
“Outside Miranda” Interrogation Tactics in Check, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1195 (2005); Alexander J. Wilson, 
Note, Defining Interrogation Under the Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 39 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 257 (2005). For scholarship discussing the Fifth Amendment in relation to court testimony, see 
H. Mitchell Caldwell & Carlo Spiga, Crippling the Defense of an Accused: The Constitutionality of the 
Criminal Defendant’s Right To Testify, 6 WYO. L. REV. 87 (2006). For scholarship discussing the Fifth 
Amendment in relation to confessions, see Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 71 
(2006) and Eric English, Note, You Have the Right To Remain Silent, Now Please Repeat Your Confession: 
Missouri v. Seibert and the Court’s Attempt To Put an End to the Question-First Technique, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 
423 (2006). 
 77 This is a much used, perhaps misused and misunderstood, term of art. In traditional warfare, the zone 
of combat was where armies faced each other: infantry and armored corps units on the battleground, air forces 
in the air and navies on the high sea. In “armed conflict short of war,” the zone of combat has been 
significantly expanded to include the civilian population and urban residential areas. The training of the soldier 
for the zone of combat is significantly different than for traditional warfare. 
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to be answered in the negative, given the inherent impracticality of American 
military personnel assuming this responsibility in the actual zone of combat. 
However, the question of whether such rights and protections should be 
granted to the detainee once he is in the interrogation setting remains to be 
satisfactorily resolved.78 
The Supreme Court has linked the Fifth Amendment’s protections against 
self-incrimination to general limitations of acceptable interrogation methods.79 
In addressing the question of extending Fifth Amendment rights to non-
citizens, courts and scholars have often wrestled with exactly this question. For 
instance, in Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the tradition of 
applying due process to aliens present within the United States, regardless of 
their legal status.80 Specifically, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment is 
incongruent with a law that would permit the indefinite detention of a non-
citizen on domestic soil.81 Thus, “[o]nce present in the country, aliens can 
claim due process protection.”82 In further addressing this question, the court in 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez denied a motion to suppress evidence 
seized by agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency while searching the home of 
a Mexican citizen without a warrant.83 
While the Court held that Fourth Amendment rights are not to be extended 
to non-citizens, Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, stated that the 
defendant should be entitled to Due Process Clause protection under the Fifth 
Amendment when his case finally went to trial.84 Specifically, the Court ruled 
that Fourth Amendment protections did not extend to the home of a Mexican 
citizen in Mexico.85 The Court, however, made a point to distinguish its 
holding from one that would have occurred had the appeal been analyzed 
 
 78 See, e.g., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 
820 (2004); Rinat Kitai, A Custodial Suspect’s Right to the Assistance of Counsel: The Ambivalence of the 
Israeli Law Against the Background of American Law, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 205 (2005); Jonathan F. Lenzner, 
Note, From a Pakistani Stationhouse to the Federal Courthouse: A Confession’s Uncertain Journey in the 
U.S.-Led War on Terror, 12 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 297 (2004). 
 79 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 80 Id.; see also Shirin Sinnar, Note, Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory Detention of Aliens 
Under the USA Patriot Act, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1419 (2003). 
 81 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. 
 82 Sinnar, supra note 80, at 1428. 
 83 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 84 Brenner A. Allen, A Cause of Action Against Private Contractors and the U.S. Government for 
Freedom of Speech Violations in Iraq, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 535 (2005). 
 85 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271–72. 
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under the Fifth Amendment.86 In looking at the language of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court noted that the Amendment applies only to “the 
people.”87 The Fifth and Sixth Amendments, however, apply to “persons” or 
“the accused,” respectively.88 The Court, although not explicitly extending 
Fifth Amendment protections to non-citizens, used dicta to indicate that such a 
holding is not beyond the pale.89 
Although the “Insular Cases”90 began the process of expanding the 
Constitution’s reach beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States, they 
did not specifically touch on the question for non-citizens.91 Specifically, the 
Insular Cases achieved four effects relevant to this distinction: (1) they offered 
explicit legal justification of American endeavors in Puerto Rico; (2) they 
created a system by which the United States, as a state, could exert power over 
a foreign entity; (3) they defined the “legitimate” framework for later political 
struggles relating to the issue of the political status of Puerto Rico and the 
grating of legal and political rights to Puerto Ricans; and (4) they created a 
framework that facilitated the establishment of practices that recognized, and 
validated, the colonial project in Puerto Rico.92 
In Eisentrager,93 the Court held that physical presence alone in the country 
creates an implied guarantee of certain rights, which become even more 
 
 86 Id. at 269 
 87 Id. at 265. 
 88 Id. at 266. 
 89 Id. at 270–71. 
 90 The “Insular Cases” are nine cases addressing the constitutional questions of the status of Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines in 1901. The Insular Cases also include a series of cases including Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 
258 U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 
(1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); and Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
 91 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 at 268. 
 92 See generally Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should Be Expanded To Include the Insular Cases 
and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241 (2000). 
 93 See supra note 71 discussing habeas corpus for military activity. The historical litany of this distinction 
began in 1891 with the case of Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), in which an American seaman was 
suspected of murder on an American ship in Japan. The defendant was then tried and convicted by a consular 
court in Japan, appealed based on a Fifth Amendment claim, and the Supreme Court denied the appeal because 
the trial took place outside of the United States, and thus the Fifth Amendment did not apply. Id. at 464. In that 
case, the Court acknowledged that it was a valid question whether the person asserting constitutional 
protection was inside or outside of the United States. This line of cases continued with the Insular Cases 
running from 1901–1922. See cases cited supra note 90. Specifically, cases considered within the progeny of 
the Insular Cases dealt with the land acquired by the United States during the Spanish–American War. This 
was the first time, the Court noted, that some constitutional rights could be extended out to U.S. territories; but 
only some rights would be here extended, as the territory was not fully incorporated. See Downes v. Bidwell, 
182 U.S. 244, 292 (1901). 
GUIORA GALLEYSPROOFS.2 6/28/2012 10:28 AM 
182 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
extensive when an active statement of intent to become a citizen is made.94 
Specifically, the Court noted that, “in extending constitutional protections 
beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the 
alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power 
to act.”95 Applying these principles to the discussion of Guantanamo detainees, 
the court in Khalid v. Bush held that Guantanamo Bay detainees do not possess 
any cognizable rights because non-citizens detained by the United States 
beyond the domestic borders (as the court argued to be the case with 
Guantanamo Bay) cannot avail themselves of constitutional protections.96 
Rasul v. Bush offers a more appropriate frame of reference on the question of 
the interplay between the decisions of Guantanamo’s territorial status and the 
proper extension of constitutional protections.97 Rasul stands for the 
proposition that the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a detainee’s habeas 
petition whenever they are held in a place where the “United States exercises 
complete jurisdiction and control.”98 
The court in In re Guantanamo Detainees, further arguing for 
constitutional protections for detainees, cited Rasul as recognizing the 
precedent from Eisentrager barring claims of an alien seeking to enforce the 
U.S. Constitution in a habeas proceeding outside of a sovereign territory of the 
United States.99 However, the court held that the Eisentrager decision, which 
denied German detainees constitutional rights, was inapplicable to the 
Guantanamo detainees because the detainees, unlike the Germans, “have been 
imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive 
jurisdiction and control.”100 
With respect to granting Miranda rights to the detainees, then, an expanded 
articulation of due process rights would suggest that both the Constitution and 
Supreme Court precedent would tolerate this extension. While the public safety 
exception to Miranda has been suggested as applicable to individuals 
suspected of involvement in terrorism, this is, I suggest, akin to mixing apples 
 
 94 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766 (1950). 
 95 Id. at 771. 
 96 Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (concerning foreign nationals captured on the 
battlefield and brought to Guantanamo Bay filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus). 
 97 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 467 (2004). 
 98 Id. at 480 (internal quotations omitted). 
 99 In re Guantanamo Detainees, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 449 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 100 Id. at 476. The German detainees were held and tried by the U.S. Army in the “China Theatre.” 
However, upon their convictions they were sent to Germany to serve their sentences. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 
766. 
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and oranges.101 The interrogation is extraordinarily complicated and complex; 
it is also fraught with anxiety and fear. Furthermore, the fundamental 
disproportionate position between interrogator and interrogatee is the essence 
of the relationship between the two individuals. The former represents and 
manifests the maximization of state power whereas the latter is at his most 
vulnerable. In 1931, The Wickersham Commission Report determined that 
willful infliction of pain, the “third degree,” on criminal suspects was 
widespread and pervasive.102 The Commission further determined that the 
abusers included not just interrogators, but the entire system: police officers, 
judges, magistrates, and other officials of the criminal justice system.103 
In the post-Reconstruction Deep South, those detained by law enforcement 
officials were mainly poor, illiterate African Americans, subjected to threats, 
cumulative mistreatment, and additional interrogation methods that violated 
constitutional safeguards.104 The Deep South interrogation methods continued 
until the Supreme Court finally extended Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 
protections to interrogations that state and local law enforcement conducted by 
imposing the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process requirements and 
extending the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule.105 
In that vein, the protections articulated by the Supreme Court in Miranda 
were intended to protect the detainee from involuntary and coerced 
confessions. In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren wrote: 
We might not find the defendants’ statements to have been 
involuntary in traditional terms. Our concern for adequate safeguards 
to protect precious Fifth Amendment rights is, of course, not lessened 
in the slightest. In each of the cases, the defendant was thrust into an 
unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation 
procedures. The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully 
apparent . . . . To be sure, the records do not evince overt physical 
coercion or patent psychological ploys. The fact remains that in none 
of these cases did the officers undertake to afford appropriate 
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safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the 
statements were truly the product of free choice.106 
In subsequent decisions over the past forty years, the Court has created 
exceptions but has refused to overturn Miranda.107 In Dickerson, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote: 
We hold that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, 
may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline 
to overrule Miranda ourselves. We therefore hold that Miranda and 
its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made 
during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.108 
While Rehnquist had, over the course of years, advocated overruling Miranda, 
the Court in Dickerson re-affirmed Miranda’s core holdings as constitutional 
protections rather than a mere prophylactic. The suggestion, then, is that 
Miranda guarantees, though whittled down by exceptions, have withstood the 
test of time and interpretation and are, indeed, constitutional protections. 
In an expansive articulation of due process, then, extending Miranda 
protections to individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism most 
effectively guarantees the rights of detainees in a rights-less regime. By 
extending the privilege against self-incrimination to post-9/11 detainees, the 
implicit danger of coerced, involuntary confessions would be largely 
eliminated. This is particularly important from an operational perspective; 
receipt of incorrect information from a suspect can directly contribute to a 
misallocation of resources that significantly hampers counterterrorism.109 
Simply put: a suspect subject to an interrogation devoid of protections and 
rights is more liable than a protected interrogatee to provide incorrect 
information.110 That is, my recommendation to extend Miranda protections to 
individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism is intended to both protect 
the detainee and directly facilitate more effective operational counterterrorism. 
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While the public safety exception has been recommended as applicable to 
counterterrorism as justification for denying Miranda protections to post-9/11 
detainees,111 the danger of trampling on individual rights outweighs 
information that interrogators may conceivably receive. The rule of law is at its 
most vulnerable in the interrogation setting; to that extent, while public safety 
may be perceived as beneficial to society, the possible gain is, at best, short 
term with long-term dangers looming in the offing. 
V. JUDICIAL FORUMS 
The fundamental premise is that detainees must be afforded the opportunity 
to be brought before a court of law for purpose of adjudication of their guilt or 
innocence. Whether the paradigm adopted is the criminal law or a hybrid, the 
guiding principle must be trial rather than the abyss of permanent indefinite 
detention. While various proposals and articles have been put forth,112 
resolution has eluded decision-makers. The Bush Administration’s attempt113 
to establish military commissions was roundly criticized.114 While subsequent 
instructions prepared by the Department of Defense115 were intended to 
mollify the chorus of criticism, the practical reality is the commissions have 
been widely viewed as an overwhelming failure.116 Neither in their original 
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inception nor subsequent tweaking were rules, procedures, and criteria 
adequately delineated with respect to suspect (and subsequently, defendant) 
rights.117 Nevertheless, the largely acknowledged failure of the military 
commissions has not resulted in the establishment of a viable alternative. 
To that end, in addition to the military commissions, there are three options 
for bringing individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism before a court of 
law: treaty-based international terror court, Article III civilian court, and a 
national security court. While I have advocated the establishment of the latter, 
the other options have also garnered significant—and justified—public 
support.118 The critical question, in determining which option most effectively 
meets rule of law requirements, is whether the due process rights of the 
defendant are protected. That question, however, cannot be asked nor answered 
in a vacuum, nor absolutely; for the reality of terrorism/counterterrorism is that 
legitimate operational realities justify minimizing certain rights, otherwise 
protected.119 In particular, with respect to the trial process, protecting 
confidential sources is an absolute state requirement, and to that end, denying 
the defendant the right to confront all witnesses is legitimate.120 Although 
controversial and suggestive of a rights minimization regime, bringing a 
suspected terrorist to trial requires submitting confidential information to the 
court.121 
While introducing classified information denies the defendant the right to 
confront his accuser, it is a reality of operational counterterrorism.122 Similarly, 
in the American criminal law paradigm, the defendant has the right to a trial by 
a jury of his peers.123 While proponents of Article III courts say they are 
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appropriate for suspected terrorists, the critical question—yet to be resolved—
is whether all individuals detained post-9/11 are to be tried. To the point: while 
President Obama promised to close Guantanamo, the issue extends 
significantly beyond the detention center in Cuba.124 According to senior 
military commanders, the United States, directly and indirectly, detains 
approximately 25,000 detainees in detention centers in Iraq and Afghanistan in 
addition to Guantanamo.125 
While some have suggested that the Iraqi and Afghan judiciaries are 
appropriate forums for adjudicating guilt of detainees presently detained in 
both countries, significant and sufficient doubt has been raised regarding 
objectivity and judicial fairness.126 Precisely because the Bush Administrations 
have ordered the American military to engage in Iraq and Afghanistan in 
accordance with the Authorization to Use Military Force resolution passed by 
Congress, the United States bears direct responsibility for ensuring 
adjudication in a court of law premised on the “rule of law.”127 Simply put: 
core principles of due process and fundamental fairness demand the United 
States ensure resolution of individual accountability. 
While imposing American judicial norms on Iraq and Afghanistan raise 
legitimate international law questions regarding violations of national 
sovereignty, the continued denial of due process raises questions and concerns 
no less legitimate. History suggests there is no perfect answer to this question; 
similarly, both basic legal principles and fundamental moral considerations 
suggest that in a balancing analysis the scale must tip in favor of trial, 
regardless of valid sovereignty and constitutional concerns. While justice is 
arguably not blind, continued detention of thousands of suspects without hope 
of trial is a blight on society that violates core due process principles. 
Regardless of which proposal above is adopted, the fundamental 
responsibility is to articulate and implement a judicial policy facilitating trial 
before an impartial court of law. That is the minimum due process obligation 
owed the detainee. 
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VI.  MOVING FORWARD 
Due process is the essence of a proper judicial process; denial of due 
process, whether in interrogation or trial, violates both the Constitution and 
moral norms. Denying suspects and defendants due process protections results 
in counterterrorism measures antithetical to the essence of democracies. While 
threats posed by terrorism must not be ignored, there is extraordinary danger in 
failing to carefully distinguish between real and perceived threats. Casting an 
extraordinarily wide net results in denying the individual rights; similarly, 
there is no guarantee that such an approach contributes to effective operational 
counterterrorism. Extending constitutional privileges and protections to non-
citizens does not threaten the nation-state; rather, it illustrates the already 
slippery slope. In proposing that due process be an inherent aspect of 
counterterrorism, I am in full accordance with Judge Bates’ holding. The time 
has come to implement his words in spirit and law alike; habeas hearings are 
an important beginning but do not ensure adjudication of individual 
accountability. Determining innocence or guilt is essential to effective 
counterterrorism predicated on the rule of law. 
 
